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I. law is an expanding discipline, and is growing at exponential rates. Germany is certainly the most prolific of all European legal communities, boasting a production of not less than 11
habilitations theses defended over the last years, many more than several hundred pages each.
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The Netherlands is hardly less active, and is arguably more effective because it tends to give up the use of its own language in its habilitations. This provides me with a unique opportunity to try a different approach. My objective in this essay will be to explore and explain why Europe has become such a fascinating laboratory. Messages from a laboratory should not be expected to transmit elaborated, complete conceptualizations. The specific risk of such messages is their tendency to seem both cryptic and eclectic simply because they presuppose too much background information. Their possible benefit, however, is that they may create and enhance interest in proceedings in the laboratory, and in fact may excite study on this side of the Atlantic.
The essay will proceed in two steps. Section I will first sketch out how the three disciplines of European law, comparative law and private international law approach the Europeanization process. It is submitted that none of these disciplines can effectively address the unique intricacies of the Europeanization process. A two-step argument is presented to support this thesis. First, I will resort to an analysis of the European Union (EU) as a "multilevel system of governance" and the critique of "methodological nationalism" in political science. Second, I will provide a preliminary reconstruction of these theorems into a more legal, albeit trans-disciplinary, language. Section II will substantiate my skepticism as to the potential of the three established legal disciplines to effectively orient the process of
Europeanization through an analysis of three case studies. The first example is from the field of product liability law, where the European Court of Justice (ECJ) seems to suggest that European legislation should govern Europeanization. The second example addresses the privatization of public services-specifically the legal battle between European state aid law, a section of the Treaty chapter on competition policy, and regulatory arrangements at the national level. In characterizing this tension, I will use the term "diagonal conflict" and praise the ECJ for its sensitivity to the non-unitary character of the European polity and its "proceduralizing" approach to the resolution of tensions. The third example is drawn from company law. Whereas the jurisprudence of the ECJ since its famous Centros 6 judgment is widely interpreted as a move towards regulatory competition, I will defend a different interpretation arguing that the ECJ is transforming the economic freedoms as enshrined in the European Community Treaty 7 into political rights of European citizens. The case studies do not reveal a new "system" of principles and rules. Rather, they illuminate patterns of change which are at work-and in conflict-in the Europeanization Process. Section III will take up the analytical framework introduced in the second part of Section I. It will substantiate the reconstruction of Europe's multi-level system of governance into a framework of legal categories. The concluding message will be that the Europeanization of private law should be conceived as a process which must find its legitimacy in the normative quality of that process. 
I. Europeanization as a Contest of Legal Disciplines
Three legal disciplines seem particularly close to the Europeanization process in the realm of private law-European law, comparative law and private international law. "Close" is a metaphor for the validity criteria and normative perspectives of these disciplines, however they are not identical. For that reason claims of these disciplines to govern and orient the Europeanization represent a contest, akin to the "contest of faculties" Immanuel Kant so ironically analyzed in his famous 1789 essay. 8 Kant's master discipline is not among the three candidates engaged in the contest. Kant's master discipline is philosophy. It is this discipline which he sought to promote because in it reason (Vernunft) is the highest authority, in fact the only authority. Philosophy is not among the three candidates engaged in the contest we are looking at. Should that imply that no candidate deserves the championship in our contest? Not exactly. Although the allusion to Kant is intended to signal a conceptual and normative lacunae in our discourse, I do not wish to insinuate that we could derive from practical philosophy satisfactory answers to our queries. My contention is more modest, but still ambitious enough. It has both an analytical and a prescriptive dimension. The analytical argument rests on the premise that all three disciplines are not yet conceptually in tune with the post-national constellation the Europeanization process has generated.
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They are still ruled by their inherited methodological nationalism.
10
This is why they are engaging in a contest which none of them can effectively win. In essence, they need to transform their contest into a search for a new paradigm, and it goes without saying that the generalizing qualifications which I will be using are inadequate in that they do not exhaust the specter of tendencies and views in any of fields under consideration. Comprehensive accounts are not possible. But they might also be unnecessary. My claim, however, is that the term 8 Immanuel Kant, The Contest of Faculties, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS (Hans Reiss, ed., 2nd ed. 1991).
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Two concepts seem particularly helpful in this respect. One is Jürgen Habermas's "post-national constellation", introduced in an essay on the contemporary problems of democratic governance. Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy, in JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 58-112 (2001). That term and Habermas's normative concerns are of general importance. Constitutional democracies were institutionalized in nation states and federations. Post-national constellations are therefore highly ambivalent-as the debates on the European Union's democracy deficit document. In the "Editor's Introduction" to Habermas' essays, Max Pensky explains the term constellation as correcting the understanding of "globalization as the end of democratization-not as its culmination but as the defining feature of the historical epoch marking the end of the national-state model for the institution of democracy". The erosion of that model is accompanied by conflicting fears and hopes: "Finding a way to sort them out, to confront their ambiguity squarely, and to shed some explanatory light on them -to analyze them as challenges, rather than as overwhelming fate-is not so easy. But this is the task that Jürgen Habermas sets for himself in The Postnational Constellation." Id. at viii. 10 On these terms, see I.4 infra.
"methodological nationalism" is effective in that it captures and conveys the unique national characteristics from the formative phases which have remained decidedly influential. The validity of the argument does not depend on the current strength of these inherited orientations. Quite to the contrary, it claims that these traditions are eroding and is a plea for their conscious abolition.
I.1 European Law
My argument may sound particularly irritating in relation to the first-named discipline, European law. Isn't the European project exactly about the abolition of the nation-state as a sovereign entity? Yes and no. The answer is yes insofar as the European Community was designed as a primarily economic project, which would not establish a federation or an entity substituting the nation-state but rather was designed to exert a disciplining control over it. The answer is no, insofar as conceptualizations of European law in general-and of European private law in particular-copy nation-state models. Both dimensions can be observed in the legendary Van Gend en Loos 11 judgment, which marks the birth of the Integration-ThroughLaw project:
The EEC Treaty… "is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between contracting states". … The … "Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which not only comprise Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law, therefore, not only imposes obligations on individuals, but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage…"
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This message has evolved into the supremacy doctrine 13 , in which community laweven secondary law-trumps national law-even constitutional law. It is, paradoxically enough, the steady deepening of European integration which renders the orthodox understanding of legal supranationalism factually implausible and normatively unattractive. private law arena through a somewhat disdained backdoor-consumer protection. Consumer protection has been both a functional need and a normative achievement since the 1970s.
Initially, the European Commission supported pertinent research activities and the formation of a European community of consumer law advocates.
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The private law community, however, generally responded with benign neglect for as long as practically possible. When the growing weight of European law grew irresistibly, however, attitudes changed profoundly.
The lamenting over the patchwork character of European legislative acts characterized by early initiatives in the realm of consumer protection 16 was followed by the plea for nothing less than a European codification of private law. The alliance defending this idea is, however, has been decidedly heterogeneous. The call for these civil codes is not in touch with the present state of the European Union and neither of these perspectives seem normatively attractive. These reservations will be substantiated below 42 after a discussion of the two other competing disciplines: comparative law and private international law.
I.2 Comparative Law
European law is often perceived as an autonomous body of law, striving for the harmonization, and often even the uniformity, of rules. Such a perception, however, is overly simplistic and incomplete. Even European law as enshrined in the original 1958 Treaty and the many later amendments is not uniform throughout the Union. Because the uniformity of its meaning cannot be ensured through the adoption of a common text (as translated in so many languages), there is no such thing as a common European law. I would summarize some two decades of co-teaching European law with many colleagues from many European countries.
What we have instead (and have learned to live with) are Belgium, Dutch, English, French, German, Italian and many more versions of European law. In essence, there are as many European laws as there are relatively autonomous legal discourses, organized mainly along national, linguistic and cultural lines. How could it be otherwise? In the core areas of private law, the European Union has so far affected only marginal change. Indeed, Europe's systems of private law are deeply entwined in the economic and political circumstances of the polities which they order and to which they owe their legitimacy. Comparative law is the discipline which seems best equipped to explore and articulate these insights. because of the common interest of all Europeans to learn about the most dynamic of all legal cultures, the United States. This is now changing rapidly. Intra-European comparative studies are well under way. 44 These activities are accompanied by rich theoretical debates. It is not my ambition here to review, let alone evaluate, these myriad debates and studies. I will instead point to the often quite paradoxical dimensions of the present state of the comparative artcomparative law owes its existence to the discovery of legal diversity as established by the Westphalian state system. Comparatists have always done both: they have underlined the autonomy of legal systems and sought for substantive similarities and functional equivalents. 45 In both orientations they have cultivated traditions of "methodological nationalism" which are not well prepared to understand de-nationalization processes, the interactions between formerly more autonomous legal systems and their links to transnational levels of governance. 
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This common heritage has in his view survived the formation of the European nation 44 Suffice it here to point again to the Common Core project, supra note 4, the ius commune lectures and casebook series; Ole Lando's Lando group; the new attention for integration perspectives. What may look like a strange loop at first sight has its logic. In order to survive and gain acceptance, Europe's common legal heritage seems to depend upon a helping legislative hand.
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I.3 Private International Law
The tensions between private international law and European law are fascinating and they have a history of their own.
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Since European law established itself as a sui generis discipline between national public law and international law, and the integration process did not address it for such a long time, the masters of the new discipline did not pay it a great deal of attention. 53 The decisions in which the ECJ adjudicated private international law constellations and set aside its rules and principles without mentioning this discipline are indeed legion.
Academic discoveries and encounters were bound to follow. Private international law scholars started to recommend their discipline as the softer alternative to a harmonization of substantive law. 54 Some of them began to realize that the principle of mutual recognition adopted by the ECJ in its celebrated Cassis de Dijon decision amounted to a duty to apply foreign mandatory (public) law. 55 The Community legislators resorted to choice-of-law rules in its secondary legislation.
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Consumer lawyers saw a chance to overcome the social poverty of private international law (die Armut des IPR an sozialen Werten). 57 Intensive research has been undertaken to determine to what degree European law, especially the fundamental freedoms and the principle of mutual recognition, trump private international law.
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By now, we are witnessing, particularly in Germany, 59 the steady growth of this sophisticated debate-a debate which will likely go on for some time to come. These developments are all the more interesting since in European law the awareness that European law can be constructively interpreted as a conflict-of-laws discipline is gaining some ground. What remains apparently difficult to accept is the message that choice-of-law methodologies can be used in postnational constellations where they no longer refer to a comprehensive legal system, but rather organize the cooperation between different levels of governance and resolve the tensions which result within national systems from the selective interventions of European law.
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The message of such analyses is no longer to recommend private international law as a softer alternative to harmonization or unification. It is a much more radical quest to take the non-hierarchical, plural 62 ("heterarchical"
63
) characteristics of the European polity seriously.
To anticipate the argument which will be developed later 64 in more detail: None of Europe's semiautonomous political subunits, are empowered with the Kompetenz-Kompetenz-the power to determine one's range of competences-which would be necessary for an authoritative resolution of jurisdictional conflicts. Equally, and even more importantly, the type of conflicts it has to resolve are not those for which private international law scholars suggest their jurisdiction selecting rules (Verweisungsnormen).
I.4 A First Outlook into International Relations Theory: The Poverty of Methodological
Nationalism in Post-national Constellations
To argue that legal disciplines like private international law and comparative law are tied in their conceptual foundations to the sovereign nation state, is taking tea to India. Similarly, it
should not come as a surprise that one can identify tendencies in the present debates toward the building up of a federal-type of European state in the integration process or continuities and analogies with the formation of nation-states. This is not the gist of the argument this FESTSCHRIFT KEGEL 223 (1977) . As Gunther Teubner explains, the point was no longer merely to reflect conflicts between national legal systems theoretically and cope with them in practice, but to generalize conflict-of-laws thinking itself in such a way as to make it yield results for conflicts between complexes of norms, areas of law and legal institutions, but also those between social systems, indeed even for divergences between competing social theories. This two-fold recourse to rich historical experience of private international law on the one hand and to competing theories of society on the other managed to establish "conflicts of laws" as the central category for legal reconstruction of social contradictions. essay seeks to develop. That argument is more complex, more radical and more constructive.
In a nutshell: There are structural reasons for the need to loosen the ties of our discipline with the nation-state and to replace that heritage by a different model. Europe is neither an international organization nor a federation but can best be characterized as a "multi-level system of governance sui generis." This is a terminology widely used among political scientists. The scheme points to developments which do not just affect the Member States of the European Union but are of general importance-even though they less intensively felt in the United States than in Norway, for instance. Zürn's operationalization of the postnational constellation is particularly helpful for legal analyses because he makes us aware of the interactions and interdependences that affect political processes and law-making process within national systems. Last but not least, his scheme helps to overcome the famous schism between functionalist and intergovermentalist theories of European integration because it links both approaches in a plausible way.
I.5. A Preliminary Step Towards a Legal Conceptualization of the Europeanization Process
"Multi-level governance" and "methodological nationalism" are not legal concepts-we cannot rely on them as "objectively valid" restatements of "the reality," or "apply" them in legal conceptualizations and reasoning. Their import into the world of law requires their reconstruction in the introduction of normative dimensions into analytical concepts. Zürn's critique of methodological nationalism is a step in that direction because Zürn pleads for a new orientation for both politics and policy-making. What I suggest is a step towards a reconstruction of the legal dimension of the European polity-to start with a suggestion 70 Similarly, the sociological version of Ulrich Beck is instructive. "Methodological nationalism takes the following premises for granted: it equates societies with nation-state societies, and sees states and their governments as the cornerstone of social-scientific analysis." Ulrich Beck, Toward a New Critical Theory with a Cosmopolitan Intent, CONSTELLATIONS, 10:4, at 453 (2003) . Beck distinguishes further between methodological and normative nationalism. "In a normative sense, nationalism means that every nation has the right to self-determination within the frame of its cultural distinctiveness." Id. at 454. He emphasizes the blurring of the "boundaries between political, moral and social communities." Id. at 455. Such processes mean, so he goes on to argue, that we can no longer rely in our analyses on "national organization as a structural principle of societal and political action." Id. at 456. Instead, we must search for and identify with a "cosmopolitan perspective"-the equivalent of a "methodological universalism." Passim.
submitted some time ago. 71 To resume briefly, the national systems of private law have all found responses to the tensions between economic efficiency, functional necessities and the normative commitments of welfare states-and the legitimacy of their these responses is unquestioned. European integration exposes these systems to new exigencies, namely that of market integration which was the main objective of the European Economic Community and was both an indispensable prerequisite and a crucial element of its harmonization policies.
Europeanization as a process can therefore be characterized by a fundamental tension-The European project of market integration started to impose its functionalist logic on the private law systems of the Member-states, their various legal traditions and visions of private law justice. The tension could neither be resolved by the replacement of European law by a supranational equivalent of nation-state law; nor can national law be replaced by European exercises in market building. Such exercises may result in disintegrative effects-or trigger innovative developments within national systems. Such risks and potentials are explored in the following section. This analysis remains a useful starting point, however, it must be refined mainly because the integration project has continuously widened in scope. It has increasingly affected national systems, which in turn have learned to develop more sophisticated responses to these external legal stimuli. The brief references to these two non-legal categories-"Multilevel governance" and "methodological nationalism"-suffice to substantiate this observation a step further: It follows from the characterization of the European Union as a multi-level system of governance and from the dis-aggregation of formerly integrated national competences that the tensions between the functionalist logic of integration and the normative logic inherent in national legal systems cannot be resolved by the building up of a hierarchy within which a "higher" European level could exert comprehensive control over national law.
That is a complex formula for a clear message and a compelling logic: The European Union is no unitary state and no federation. It is composed of semi-autonomous unit, which have become interdependent. These units are not subject to some comprehensive supranational authority. The common interest in, and commitments to, the building up of a functioning market has continuously to be balanced with the normative preferences legitimized in the national legal systems. It further follows from the "heterarchical" nature of the European Union that we cannot expect its law to achieve the same type and the same degree of coherence we seek to achieve in the legal systems of unitary polities.
II. The Practice of Europeanization: Three Exemplary Patterns
Europeanization cannot be expected to reproduce a system of private law equivalent in its comprehensiveness and consistency to that of the continental civil code systems. What else will emerge out of the interaction and tensions between the functionalist logic of market integration and the normative logic of preference formation in national legal systems? This question has an empirical and a normative dimension, and both are contested. As a first approximation to the state of the debate on the objectives of Europeanization and of the best means to achieve them we can look again at the contest of the legal disciplines and read their disciplinary approaches as both a description of the Europeanization process and a cure to the failures they perceive. We then become aware that their contest is linked to an ancillary agenda, namely a contest over the structuring of the emerging European polity which takes place between-but also within-the individual disciplines. To rephrase the perceptions and positions already mentioned:
1. Europeanization is about to destroy the systematic coherence of private law. This is a widely-shared concern, particularly in Germany. 72 One cure to that problem is to replace national laws with a European law more systematically, i.e., to proceed from the limited interventions characteristic of Europeanization thus far, to a more comprehensive European code. 73 An alternative here would be to reduce European legislative activities, defend national legal cultures and organize co-operation via private international law. 74 2. Europeanization, like globalization, fosters deregulation, privatization and regulatory competition, an assessment that can lead to two competing conclusions. While (some) proponents of the "European social model" seek to defend the social dimensions of private law with the help of a European code, 75 proponents of economic efficiency argue that Europeanization has the potential of modernizing and rationalizing 72 See supra note 16. 73 See supra notes 18 and 19. 74 See supra note 54. 75 European private law, not just because it values individual freedoms so highly, but because the exercise of these freedoms will trigger processes of regulatory competition. 76 Whose perception is correct, which normative options are open, which perception deserves support? It seems worth noting at the outset that "methodological nationalism" requires orchestrating the concert of voices just described-and it might be that the Europeanization process is not adequately represented by any of them.
How can one determine whether this is so? There is certainly no way to describe the Europeanization process comprehensively. What seems possible and instructive, however, is to explore patterns of this process to which we can ascribe exemplary importance. This is indeed the thrust of the following case studies. Each relates to a distinct link between European and national law. The first example from the field of product liability law concerns a field in which the European legislature has been active, providing an excellent example of an encounter between European (supranational) and national private law. The second example is drawn from the field of company law and concerns the impact of European primary law on national legal systems. The third example addresses the tensions between European policies in the field privatization of public services and national distributive policies, more technically speaking between European state aid law, a section of the Treaty chapter on competition policy, and regulatory arrangements at the national level. The exemplary quality of these three types of conflicts seems obvious. One has to be cautious, however, when evaluating the results reached in each of the cases. The language of European law is seemingly compelling doctrinal logic. Its messages, however, are much more indeterminate and ambivalent.
II.1 Product Liability Law: the Poverty of Orthodox Supranationalism
Consumer protection used to be perceived as the flagship of Europeanization. The signals were surprising. The European Community, so often described and criticized as building up its common market through strategies of "negative" integration (the abolition of legal provisions impeding free trade) entered the field of private law through the promotion of a "social" private law, promoting a field unknown or marginal in some states, of dubious reputation in others. The frontlines seemed clear: on the one side, the European Community, promoting directives on consumer protection, 77 unfortunately constrained by the unanimity rule of Article 100, but advised and encouraged by a transnational epistemic community of consumer law advocates; on the other side, the defenders of the unity or normative coherence of the national private law system, complaining about such interventions, questioning the Community's competence 78 and questioning the validity of the argument that uniform rules of consumer protection would enhance the quality of competitive processes.
The ECJ Judgments of 25 April 2002 on the Product Liability Directive
The Directive 85/374/EEC 79 on Product Liability was widely considered to be a piece of legislation with many defects. It harmonized only a small segment of product liability law.
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Its standard of consumer protection seemed unimpressive. 81 Critics, skeptics and defenders agreed, however, as to its efficacy, tending to characterize its reach as quite marginal legislation that would neither do much good nor much harm. This conclusion seemed to be well-founded in view of Article 13 which provided that the Directive did "not preclude the application of other systems of contractual or non-contractual liability based on other grounds, such as fault or a warranty in respect of latent defects" and hence did not affect national tort law.
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It was also quasi a communis opinio that consumer protection provisions should be understood as minimum standards which would not pre-empt the adoption of more stringent rules by national legislatures. 87 The two parallel decisions concerned the conformity of transpositions going beyond its standards of protection with the Directive: Greece had wanted to spare its citizens from the personal contribution of 500 Euro provided for in Article 9 I (b) of the Directive (Case C-183/00, para. 8). France wanted to hold the distributor liable alongside the manufacturer, and, additionally, to restrict the exemptions from liability foreseen in Article 7 of the Directive (Case C-52/00, para. 6).
1984, under which the claimant had only to prove damage and a causal connection. Under the Product Liability Directive, implemented 10 years after the 1984 Law, 88 she also had to prove that the hospital had produced the blood conserves, which she failed to show. Therefore, the success of her claim depended on the relationship between the three legal bases. In its analysis of the Community law provisions, the ECJ refers to Recital 1 in the preamble of the Directive, according to which "approximation is necessary because legislative divergences may distort competition and affect the movement of goods within the common market and entail a differing degree of protection of the consumer against damage caused by a defective product to his health or property."92 It had been necessary at the time to introduce this sentence, in order to "establish" the Community's (functional) legislative competence.
Since then, the paragraph has become neither more empirically relevant, nor normatively more correct. Nevertheless, the Court's judgment reaffirmed its value as a virtually teleological motivation for restricting Member States' legislative autonomy.93 88 
Critique
The style of reasoning of the ECJ is often formalistic for many reasons, among them the precarious legitimacy of the Court. Is formalism a plausible strategy and normatively sound response to queries with the Court's legitimacy? Should the commentators of the Court seek to protect it by submitting restrictive interpretations of the judgment? The annotations to the judgment are in disagreement. A German commentator, in a very comprehensive and careful analysis, 94 suggests that the ECJ's intrusion into product liability law should be read as preempting not just national transformations of the Directive, but also tort law more generally.
While the doctrinal or conceptual basis of European strict liability is not clear, what is clear is the ECJ's harmonization objective. As a result, national courts must now turn to the ECJ and submit questions of tort law to it. This can be argued under the acte claire and supremacy doctrine. According to this tandem, national courts have to ask the ECJ for clarification wherever the meaning of European concepts seems ambiguous. In this way the system seeks to ensure the uniformity of law in Europe. "What a civil law fantasy!" common law lawyers will tend to think. Or would they characterize this as a pure nightmare? If these doctrines were applied extensively, this could increase the burden of the ECJ enormously. This would imply that this court would get increasingly involved in the adjudication of issues which it is not well prepared and equipped to address. Indeed, the majority of the annotations to the ECJ's intrusion into product liability law, criticize the court for not exercising more restraint.
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It seems absolutely unlikely that national courts will abstain from developing their product liability law further and impose upon the litigating parties the burdens and references to the Directive that the ECJ judgments apparently require. At the same time, it seems equally implausible, that the ECJ will pursue a strategy of expanding its reach to include ever more responsibilities-especially responsibilities over such a complex and contested area. Given that the Product Liability Directive is based upon now outdated Treaty provisions, the chances for a more prudent exercise of judicial powers seem likely, however, such comments cannot explain, let alone justify, the Court's revival of the language of orthodox supranationalism. that any comprehensive presentation of the debate could easily fill a book. The purpose, however, for which this recent jurisprudence will be analyzed in this essay is both limited and specific. Its focus is an analysis of the law-generating process, in which individuals and companies exercising their economic freedoms under national and European legislation, and both national and European courts, participate and interact. To start with the three theses this analysis will defend: (1) The ECJ's company law case law has transformed economic freedoms into rights of political participation; (2) the ECJ's jurisprudence is not exposing company law to the logic of economic processes but rather strives towards a "juridification" of regulatory competition; and (3) the theoretical and practical challenge of these law-generating processes stems from their "constitutional" importance. A constitutionalization of the European Union, which seeks to ensure the legitimacy of its law production must turn its attention to the quality of these processes.
II.2 Company Law: The Transformation of Economic Freedoms into Political Rights
Centros
The judgment in Centros concerns the core of all the European legal rules and principles (the famous acquis communautaire), namely, the freedoms of market citizens, which apply directly and ought, therefore, to take primacy over national law. Moreover, the decision counts as an extension and strengthening of a perception that has deeply penetrated the legal consciousness and awareness of economic law as it is held to serve so-called negative integration, because the directly applicable freedoms can be invoked by European citizens when asking for review of the content of national law by the ECJ. And through such reviews, national laws can be 96 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459 [1999] . 97 Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon , 1979 E.C.R. 649. 98 exposed to "regulatory competition." These perceptions of Centros have their fundamentum in re, but they neglect important dimensions.
As so often occurs, the facts of this cause célèbre were quite trivial. "It is contrary to Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty for a Member State to refuse to register a branch of a company formed in accordance with the law of another Member State in which it has its registered office but in which it conducts no business where the branch is intended to enable the company in question to carry on its entire business in the state in which that branch is to be created, while avoiding the need to form a company there, thus evading application of the rules governing the formation of companies which, in that state, are more restrictive as regards the paying up of a minimum share capital." 103 Case C-212/97, para. 13: "Is it compatible with Article 52 of the EC Treaty, in conjunction with Articles 56 and 58 thereof, to refuse registration of a branch of a company which has its registered office in another Member State and has been lawfully founded with company capital of GBP 100 (approximately DKK 1 000) and exists in conformity with the legislation of that Member State, where the company does not itself carry on any business but it is desired to set up the branch in order to carry on the entire business in the country in which the branch is established, and where, instead of incorporating a company in the latter Member State, that procedure must be regarded as having been employed in order to avoid paying up company capital of not less than DKK 200 000 (at present DKR 125 000)?" 104 Sentence 1 of the tenor of the Judgment, 1999 E.C.R. I-1947.
Discussion
The ECJ decision was read by some 105 as cautiously continuing its earlier interpretations of freedom of establishment.
106
Others maintained that the ECJ was radicalizing its jurisprudence in a questionable fashion. . For a more topical discussion, see TREFIL, supra note 101. 106 Case C-79/85, Segers, 1986 E.C.R. 2375 [1986] . 107 Ernst Steindorff, Centros und das Recht auf die günstigste Rechtsordnung, 1999 JURISTENZEITUNG 1140. 108 According to the law of all common law and some continental jurisdictions, the corporate law governing the internal affairs of a given corporation is the law of the place of incorporation ("Gründung") -a very convenient doctrine for an expansionist economy like that of imperial England, comment the critics. 109 According to the theory traditionally dominating the (European) continent, the effective seat doctrine, "Sitz" or "siège reel" the internal affairs of a corporation are to be governed by the national law of the state where its effective seat is located. This doctrine is based on the assumption the seat jurisdiction has the most contact with the business of the company and should protect the what is regarded there as a public interest. 110 113 The "Delaware effect" denotes the move of companies into the legal regime most convenient to them, the (in-) famous "race to the bottom. According to the ECJ, this is simply a matter of right:
"That being so, the fact that a national of a Member State who wishes to set up a company chooses to form it in the Member State whose rules of company law seem to him the least restrictive and to set up branches in other Member States cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of establishment. The right to form a company in accordance with the law of a Member State and to set up branches in other Member States is inherent in the exercise, in a single market, of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the Treaty." 114 As Ernst Steindorff has critically observed, this argument seems to be establishing, a "right to the most favourable legal system." 115 If this were so, the ECJ could indeed be interpreted as pursuing a strategy of "negative" integration, of exposing national legislatures to a regulatory competition orchestrated by private actors or of sending Europe on the road to Delaware. But the ECJ's message is more complex-it did not question in principle the competence of Denmark to impose regulatory requirements on both its own and foreign citizens and companies. Indeed, it expressly confirmed that "a Member State is entitled to take measures designed to prevent certain of its nationals from attempting, undercover of the rights 114 Para. 27. 115 Steindorff, supra note 107. In its judgment of February 3, 2002, the Danish Supreme Court was silent on the issue of Centros' tax liability; it simply reprimanded that the forms had not been 116 Case C-212/97: "[A]ccording to the Court's case-law, national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must notgo beyond what is necessary in order to attain it …." Id. at para. 34. "Those conditions are not fulfilled in the case in the main proceedings. First, the practice in question is not such as to attain the objective of protecting creditors which it purports to pursue since, if the company concerned had conducted business in the United Kingdom, its branch would have been registered in Denmark, even though Danish creditors might have been equally exposed to risk." Id. at para. 35. "Since the company concerned in the main proceedings holds itself out as a company governed by the law of England and Wales and not as a company governed by Danish law, its creditors are on notice that it is covered by laws different from those which govern the formation of private limited companies in Denmark and they can refer to certain rules of Community law which protect them, such as the What, then, is so "rotten" -in the state of Denmark and elsewhere? 121 Denmark has to justify itself before its own citizens in the forum of the ECJ. It is entitled to pursue its regulatory interests, but it also must show that the means that it chooses serve the ends that it pursues. It must not discriminate against foreign citizens and its law should be as Community-friendly as possible.
What legal discipline are we dealing with here? Clearly we are no longer in the realm of private international law. Comparative studies on the company law traditions of the EU Member States are certainly instructive, but they do not reveal much about the proper design of company law in a multi-level system of governance. Is the Court building a European body of company law which would conceivably replace national laws-essentially a European company code? What we are witnessing is a process of law production which deals with contested regulatory objectives and the tensions of national and supranational competencies.
Europeanization occurs through a European "conflict of laws" which must cope with legal differences, in an effort to define and maintain Denmark's political autonomy while at the same time protecting rights that European law is granting to all Europeans. How else than through the shaping of procedures in which responses have to be sought could this be accomplished? Centros is dealing only with segments of company law production, namely the freedom of establishment and it proceduralizes this right. The Brydes have not acquired the "right" to replace Danish law by some other law that they find more pleasant. Rather, they have the right to initiate a process in which Denmark must justify its regulatory measures. It is precisely this reshaping of economic freedoms as rights to political participation where the constitutional core of the decision lies. This interaction is novel in that it bridges different levels of governance, yet it seems more familiar when contrasted with the interaction of private rights and the political sphere in constitutional democracies. bring his sovereign to court with the argument that the latter lacks justification for denying him the exercise of his right in accordance with the regulatory schemes approved by other Member States.
Überseering and Inspire Art
Centros produced dramatic effects at two levels. It was foreseeable that interested actors would test the strength of their legal positions explore possibilities to save capital by establishing businesses in the United Kingdom-little systematic sociological research has been undertaken so far to ascertain the true effect. 124 The debate in Centros concerned the interpretation of the new legal situation and the discussion of the next steps the ECJ would take. These steps were illuminating-and they may initiate a less doctrinal but more constructive turn in the Europeanization debate. Germany. The plaintiff sought to bring an action against the defendant, a German company, which sought compensation for defective work carried out by the company. By prescribing that a company incorporated according to Dutch law could lose its legal capacity once it transferred its "seat" (Verwaltungssitz) and would have to re-register in Germany. 126 In an internal market, such legal principles seem downright incredible.
German law is not quite that rigid, however. As Advocate General Colomer noted in his opinion, the German government had argued in the oral hearings that a company in the 124 Matthias Baudisch argues that firms will not so easily risk their reputation by engaging in some "race to the bottom" in an analysis that is not sociological but nonetheless extremely informative. plaintiff's position could, in fact, continue to assert its rights under German law, 127 and that, in German law, Überseering's passive locus standi continued to exist despite the new "seat" of the company.
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Despite this apparent way out of the dilemma, the ECJ refrained from using the escape, holding that, "[a] necessary precondition for the exercise of the freedom of establishment is the recognition of those companies by any Member State in which they wish to establish themselves."
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German law ought not to disregard the point that the Dutch company never actually intended to transfer its seat.
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Was that an unnecessary harsh treatment of Germany?
My initial impression was that the ECJ's reasoning did result in an unnecessarily harsh treatment of Germany, December 17, 1997, Inspire was required to register in the Netherlands and to add that it is a formally foreign company, which would nevertheless be subject to Dutch minimum capital and disclosure requirements, as well as provisions on personal liability of the directors.
In its ruling, the Dutch disclosure provisions were held to be incompatible with secondary Community law.
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As to the rules on minimum capital and the liability of directors, the ECJ concluded "that neither the [Dutch] Chamber of Commerce nor the Netherlands Government has adduced any evidence to prove that the measure in question satisfies the criteria of efficacy, proportionality and non-discrimination mentioned…. combating improper recourse to freedom of establishment or safeguarding fairness in business dealings or the efficiency of tax inspections." 135 What is left of private international law and its competing theories? The ECJ's reference to the rights guaranteed by the Treaty, to the supremacy of secondary legislation over national provisions on the same subject, and, last but not least, the subjection of national legislation to European standards of reasonableness, provide a Europeanization framework which is superior to anything so far conceived under private international law. This does not imply that all the objectives which were generally ascribed to the seat theory-"requirements relating to the general interest, such as the protection of the interests of creditors, minority shareholders, employees and even the taxation authorities" 136 -would now have been outlawed. They remain alive but must be reconsidered and substantiated anew in the ECJ's framework following Inspire Art.
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Germany's co-determination law is the most difficult case. What would be left of it if subjected to the yardsticks the Court has adopted in Inspire Art?
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There are reasons to believe that we need not find an answer to this question. At first blush, co-determination seems to lead us into the kind of dilemma that the recent Microsoft decision by the European Commission presented 139 -that a company present in two jurisdictions is subjected to the rules of one of them in such a way that the other jurisdiction's policy is subverted, be it de jure or de facto. Essentially, you either have co-determination or you don't. If Volkswagen operates under a co-determination at home and this is considered bad, than all the countries in which Volkswagen does business are affected by this bad regime. What kind of conceptual framework could help to resolve the socio-economic Kulturkampf between Germany's traditions and the rest of the world? Maybe we should be content with the practices already developed. Volkswagen has neither been confronted with requests to give up its commitments to co-determination nor has it threatened to leave the country because of the burdens co- It is an important characteristic of the integration process that it dissolves the links between private law and its regulatory environment.
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This disintegrative side-effect is an implication of a fundamental constitutional principle of the European construct. The EU's competences are restricted to the fields enumerated in the Treaty. The principle is uncontested in theory, but it is difficult to apply in practice. Indeed, real world constellations generally do not proceed according to the lines drawn by the drafters of the Treaty. It is typical in the European Union that the European level is competent-sometimes even exclusively-to regulate one aspect of a problem, whereas Member States remain competent to regulate another. As a result, the term "diagonal conflict" is useful to distinguish such constellations from "vertical" conflict resolutions where Community law trumps national law on the one hand, and from "horizontal" conflicts which arise from differences among the legal systems of Member States and belong to the realm of private international law on the other. What discipline can the Community exert in such fields? Can it control anticompetitive effects of national regulations? The complexity and normative sensitivity of such issues render the tasks of the ECJ ever more difficult. In principle, European law must respect national or regional political preferences-the ECJ evinced such a respect, but only in the second example was the Court's performance truly impressive.
Windmills in Schleswig Holstein
Germany's governing coalition has a common enemy, a common problem, and a common hope. The common enemy is atomic energy, the common problem is coal, both black and brown, and their hope lies in windmills. All three industries are heavily subsidized. The government's hope, however, is that the energy gained from windmills will be increasingly competitive. It will take time and money until the present technology is developed further so that environmentally friendly energy will be available at competitive prizes. The German 
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This law obliges regional public electricity suppliers to purchase all the electricity produced within their area of supply from renewable sources such as wind, water and sun; to pay for that electricity a fixed minimum price which is higher than that for other electricity.
Moreover, the law obliges upstream suppliers of electricity to pay partial compensation to those regional distribution undertakings for the additional costs caused by that purchase obligation. The 1998 amendment had not been notified.
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The present conflict was, however, initiated by the private actors on which the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz imposes the duty to use and to pay wind energy. The plaintiff PreussenElektra AG complained about the compensation of the extra costs the local energy distributor Schleswag AG incurred when purchasing from renewable sources.
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PreussenElektra argued that the 1994 amendment of the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz, which had not been notified to the Commission, should not be applied and could hence not create an obligation to compensate Schleswag. As is apparent from the fact that Schleswag was held as to 65.3% by PreussenElektra, the true addressee of the complaint was the German legislature whom the parties sought to correct with the help of European law.
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Environmental protection is a mandatory Community objective [Articles 3 (1) (l) and 6)], just as it is a Staatsziel (objective of national interest) in Germany. Thus, the conflict is not about the legitimacy of environmental protection, but rather is about the competence to 148 Case C-379/98, E.C.R. I-02099, at para. 11. 149 Id., para. 12. 150 Id. para. 13. 151 Id. paras. 20-21. 152 Id.
weigh the pros and cons of the Stromeinspeisung (i.e., the feeding of electricity from renewable energy sources into the public grid) policy. If the scheme of the German statute constituted a state aid in the sense of Article 87, it would, according to Article 88, be up to the Commission to supervise the weighing between competitive and environmental rationality, and it could seek the confirmation of its assessment by the ECJ.
Ever since 1993 and the Sloman Neptun cases 153 the Court has chosen to read Article 87 literally:
"Only advantages granted directly or indirectly through state resources are to be considered aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1). The distinction made in that provision between 'aid granted by a Member State' and aid granted 'through state resources' does not signify that all advantages granted by a state, whether financed through state resources or not, constitute aid, but is intended merely to bring within that definition both advantages which are granted directly by the state and those granted by a public or private body designated or established by the state." The distinction made in that provision between 'aid granted by a Member State and aid granted 'through State resources does not signify that all advantages granted by a State, whether financed through State resources or not, constitute aid but is intended merely to bring within that definition both advantages which are granted directly by the State and those granted by a public or private body designated or established by the State….
In this case, the obligation imposed on private electricity supply undertakings to purchase electricity produced from renewable energy sources at fixed minimum prices does not involve any direct or indirect transfer of State resources to undertakings which produce that type of electricity." There is more at stake than a conflict over the 158 Case C-379/98, paras. 58, 61. Another difficult, but less troubling as aspect of the judgment is the Court's handling of Article 28 in paras. 68-81. The German scheme was not available to foreign suppliers. This seemed acceptable to the ECJ as it found, "the nature of electricity is such that, once it has been allowed into the transmission or distribution system, it is difficult to determine its origin and in particular the source of energy from which it was produced." Id. at para. 79. 159 Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH, Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH. 160 The debate has raged for nearly a decade. See ) . This definition already presupposes that these services are no longer provided by administrative bodies but are privatized to a certain degree. It is general enough to cover various forms of "public-private partnerships" through which these services may be organized and, most importantly, it does not prescribe the public involvement in the provision of such services. This it cannot do because legal traditions, social expectations, political preferences, and administrative know-how all differ widely between Sicily and Mecklenburg, between Scotland and Greece, competences at different levels of government or the further development of environmental policies. What makes the European involvement in this field so interesting and sensitive are notions of social justice. The northern European welfare states which have so far successfully reorganized and defended their social models, would have to surrender aspects of their welfare state models if European law could insist on privatization policies which render their support of public services illegal. The problems are of course complex. It is hardly disputed that so many public services deserve to be reorganized. That reorganization will have to ensure that non-local suppliers get access to publicly co-financed service markets. There are many more reasons to welcome outside intervention and at might be that it is only thanks to the assignment of supervisory function to the European level of governance that the reform can be carried out successfully 163 -a long road to be sure, but Altmark Trans is a promising beginning.
Altmark Trans GmbH and Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH both sought to organise public transport in the Landkreis of Stendal in Sachsen Anhalt, one of the new East German states (Länder). Altmark Trans had been licensed, and procured renewal by the Regierungspräsidium (governmental authority of the Land), whereas the bid of Nahverkehrsgesellschaft was rejected. 164 The ECJ was asked to delineate the scope of European secondary legislation and the competences of the German legislature. The core issue, to which the ECJ responded, was the characterization of the German support scheme.
The ECJ opinion builds from well-known definitions of state aid but then take two innovative steps. With the first, the ECJ reduces the supervisory powers of the European Commission by expressly accepting that it is up to the national authorities to define the public interest and to pay compensation for so-defined services:
"Measures which, whatever their form, are likely directly or indirectly to favor certain undertakings or are to be regarded as an economic advantage which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions are regarded as aid." 165 Estonia and Burgundy-and these differences have to be taken into account in the efforts which the Commission has initiated (see following note) to reorganize them. 163 The most important recent official documents are the European Commission's Communication: . 164 See Case C-280, para. 21. 165 Case C-280/00, para. 84 (citations omitted).
However, "where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for the services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, so that those undertakings do not enjoy a real financial advantage and the measure thus does not have the effect of putting them in a more favorable competitive position than the undertakings competing with them, such a measure is not caught by Article 92(1) of the Treaty." 166 However, the Court subjects the non-application of the state aids regime to four conditions: (1) the recipient must be required to discharge clearly defined public service obligations; (2) the parameters of the calculated compensation must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner; (3) the compensation must not exceed costs plus a reasonable profit; and (4) decisions are to be taken either after a public procurement procedure or the level of compensation is to be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with adequate means of transport.
167
What is innovative about this holding is the redesign of the relations between the various levels of governance in the European Union. The ECJ has opened the door for policy pluralism within the Union while at the same time relieving the Commission from a supervisory burden that t would hardly be able to cope with anyway. To be sure, the new criteria the ECJ has spelled out must be refined further, but the prospects for productive contestation over the organization of public services have improved dramatically.
III. The Search for Legitimization in the Europeanization Process
Section I of this essay concluded after merely theoretical deliberation that the Europeanization process will require the development of a new discipline which would conceptualize Europe as a multi-level system of governance, overcome the legacy of methodological nationalism in European law, comparative law and private international law. The case studies in Section II can be read as confirming the utility of that analytical framework. Yet the practice of the ECJ has a utility of its own. This practice cannot be expected to fit neatly into the analytical and interpretative schemes through which we have traditionally observed it. The kind of confirmation we can expect is primarily negative in the sense that the ECJ's jurisprudence is in fact often moving beyond the horizons of conventional legal doctrines. The messages implicit in this jurisprudence do not, however, reveal a coherent set of responses to the problematic of multi-level governance. How are we to interpret them? 166 Case C-280/00, para. 87. 167 Id., paras. 88-93. Three steps will be undertaken to answer this question. The first two concern the theoretical framework of this essay. The analytics of multi-level governance will be presented in more detail.
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What then follows is a translation of the political science language into legal categories 169 and a refinement of the normative perspectives sketched out at the end of the introductory section.
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These perspectives will be concretized further in the concluding comments on the case studies.
III.1 The European Polity as a "Multi-level System of Governance sui generis"
"Less than a federation, more than a regime"-despite dating from 1983, this characterization of the European polity by William Wallace dates is not outdated. The specification that I am relying on stresses the nonhierarchical network character of the system -arguing that this perceived weakness is also a potential strength. Because the powers and also, to some degree, the resources for political action, are located at various and relatively autonomous levels dispersed throughout the Union, the responses to functionally interwoven problems must be developed through 175 -that, in the specific conditions of the European Union, successful solutions to problems can be expected from "deliberative" modes of communication based on universal motivations tied to rules and principles. What Neyer underlines in his analysis can be characterized as the "facticity"-the actual impact-of normativity. The insight that the multi-level analysis portrays constellations that legal science confronts in a similar fashion, has gained ground since a number of years. 176 The normative turn that Neyer gives to the multi-level approach, enhances its accessibility and attractiveness for lawyers considerably. It gives credit to the assumption that European governance is not unconceivable, by relying on deliberative interaction instead of the formation of hierarchies.
III.2 Integration through Deliberation as an Alternative to Orthodox Supranationalism
It is a small step from such theorizing to an interpretation of legal provisions as precepts for a communication-oriented, "deliberative" political style which can be easily explained in a broader context-in our "post-national constellations," typified by economic interpenetration and interdependency, the extra-territorial effects of the decisions and omissions of democratic polities are simply unavoidable; yet the burdens imposed unilaterally on one's neighbour cannot be sufficiently legitimated by "democratic" processes which are internal to the state. It may seem like a paradox, but it has become an irrefutable insight-nation states cannot act democratically. "No taxation without representation" -this is a principle that imposes on the Member States of the EU the obligation to take account of the interests and concerns of nonnationals even within the national polity. and its supremacy over national law. It also deviates from the "integration-through-law" tradition, in that it seeks to overcome the law-politics dichotomy inherent in J.H.H. Weiler's famous distinction between legal supranationalism and political intergovernmentalism. 178 The normative core message of Deliberative Supranationalism is that Europe, through its supranational rules and principles, should give voice to "foreign" concerns and insist that Member States mutually "recognize" their laws (essentially that they "apply" foreign law) and refrain from insisting on their lex fori and domestic interests. The discipline this principle seeks to impose on a Member State's political autonomy is limited.
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The principle and its limitations can be discovered and studied best in the jurisprudence on Article 30 (now 28).
The ECJ has so often convincingly demonstrated 180 how the idiosyncrasies of individual states can be identified as such and reduced to a civilized level-autonomieschonend und gemeinschaftsverträglich (protective of autonomy and compatible with the Community).
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What can be achieved through an enlightened interpretation of Article 28 of the EC Treaty is a resolution of frictions among national jurisdictions. But this is a very incomplete characterization of the challenges European law faces. Three interdependent complications need to be outlined.
There is a need to find a mechanism for the reconciliation of a broader variety of conflicting policies and legal traditions. The "orthodox" answer to such constellations has been "harmonization"-a search for uniformity which would rule out future conflicts. This was the strategy of the ECJ in the product liability cases discussed above. where rules are so specific as those of the product liability directive to which the ECJ ascribed pre-emptive effects, the intervention will have disintegrative consequences which damage the normative coherence of an entire field of law.
Is ever more comprehensive harmonization-in the case of private law, a European code-a promising alternative, as so many observers believe? This discrepancy between the apparent survival of private law institutions has led to an erosion of their social function which is often neglected.
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If this observation is valid, does it not become ever more plausible to opt for a European code? I have characterized the discrepancies between (European) regulatory provisions and national private law as "diagonal" conflicts.
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It has become apparent, albeit only in the specific fields under scrutiny here, that there are alternatives available to uniformity. It is possible, so we have argued, to 182 See discussion supra Section II. 1. 183 As in the case of the good faith principle of the unfair contract terms directive, analyzed by Gunther Teubner, retain diversity and to nevertheless ensure the workability of the internal market. which will affect its impact on private law-especially on contract law-considerably. The regulation of product risks and standardization are fields which underwent dramatic changes during the last decade and are unlikely to come to rest in the foreseeable future. In all fields of regulatory policy, Europe must balance centralization, coordination, and decentralization. It has relegated the adaptation of private law to the European regulatory environment to national legal systems and especially to their national courts. If flexibility is both a necessity and a goal of regulatory policy, more legislative uniformity in private law or its codification hardly seems desirable.
Private law systems are different in many ways, but not in their need for flexibility and their need to seek legitimacy in the processes of law production. That production is not confined to the application of previously given rules; nor does it operate in full autonomy. It is exposed to a continuing discourse with interested parties, experts and academics-and to the threat legislative interventions. The legitimacy and rationality of the interplay of legislation, case law, scholarship and political discourse is the resource which generates its legitimacy.
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This resource is not available in the European polity because that polity remains heterarchical.
European law is legitimated to instigate innovation and change, to organize diversity, to ensure the compatibility of diversity with Community concerns-its vocation is not to produce uniformity.
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III.3 Europeanization as Process
To summarize this lengthy argument: The complexity of the Europeanization process is nobody's "mistake." It is not by chance that we witness such a multifaceted mixture of "primary law" which grants basic freedoms and rights; transnational governance arrangements which organise regulatory activities; legislative and judicial interventions which irritate. This mixture is the State of the (European) Union. It is by no means a comfortable situation, yet it has great potential-at least in theory. Its performance to date has not been so bad-at least in the examples we have examined here. The ECJ's recent product liability cases can be interpreted as a move back into orthodox supranationalism. But this is a worst case scenario. The Court will realize that the European product liability law directive is a relatively insignificant element in a complex web of product safety law and regulation which, in Europe, is intimately related to semi-private Europeanized standardization activities. It is of course a highly contested sphere, but none of the stakeholders are likely to encourage the ECJ to take the 1985 directive as a basis from which European level of governance would seize control of legal developments.
The Centros jurisprudence, however, is of another caliber. Here, the ECJ has transformed the freedoms ensured by the EC Treaty into a true European citizenship by empowering the Untertan (subject) of a Member State to bring his or her own sovereign to court and force national governments to provide justification for their regulatory practices.
The Court also has managed to create a legal framework linking the various levels of European governance without assigning comprehensive Kompetenz-Kompetenz-the power to determine one's range of competencies-to any of them. 190 191 A further parallel between regulatory policy and private law is the turn governance alluded to in the text. What is so characteristic of all areas of regulatory politics, namely the inclusion of non-governmental actors, is currently happening in all fields of economic regulation-and it is unlikely that a European code will be able reach into these important practical spheres of modern legal systems.
The ECJ has performed less well in its reaction to the tensions between European state aid policies on the one hand, and national environmental concerns and industrial policy objectives on the other in the PreussenElektra case.
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Its restrictive definition of state aid allows flexibility for legislative strategies by national policy makers which avoid any contestation. 193 This type of judicial self-restraint has been followed and corrected by a much more promising strategy in the Altmark Trans judgment. The reform of public services (services publiques, Daseinsvorsorge) need not have uniform results. Legal traditions, social expectations, political preferences, and administrative know-how differ widely between Sicily and Estonia, between Scotland and Greece. Europe can continue to initiate further changes, and foster social learning at the same time. This is its mandate-the imposition of uniform regimes would be a nightmare. 194 Europeanization is about social learning through conflict management and contestation. The role of law in such a law in that process is essential. But the law itself must learn how to find principles and provide procedures which organize the interactions between political actors and courts at varying levels of governance, and must function to both accompany and legitimate social change. This is both a challenge and an opportunity. 192 See discussion supra. 193 See II.3.1 supra. 194 See II.3.2 supra.
